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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between bank capital ratios and lending rates using data 
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corporate lending. Such instability is difficult to reconcile with many well-established theories of 
financial intermediation but is consistent with the relatively recent theories of bank portfolio 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the relationship between bank capital and loan interest rates for a 
panel of UK banks covering altogether about three quarters of the UK lending market. Our 
focus is on the cyclicality or state-dependence of this relationship during the period from 
October 1998 to December 2012, i.e. the possibility that it differs between episodes of 
rapid credit expansion (when times are ‘good’, before the global credit crisis) and periods 
of crisis and moderate credit growth (the ‘bad’ times, or subsequent years).  
There are limits to the conclusions that can be drawn from an exercise of this nature. 
Bank capital decisions are endogenously determined alongside loan supply and interest 
rate decisions, and influenced also by loan demand. Our estimated coefficients cannot be 
reliably interpreted as representing the impact of an exogenous policy change such as an 
increase in the level of bank regulatory capital requirements. Nonetheless, even though 
the estimations we report are based on reduced-form models, they do provide some 
insights into a key question: what theory provides an adequate and consistent account of 
the portfolio and loan rate decisions of UK banks before and after the crisis?  
The reason that even a reduced-form estimation strategy may be informative is that 
the most well-established theories prior to the crisis share one common feature: they 
adopt modelling frameworks in which bank portfolio choices are driven by bank specific 
factors such as capitalisation, liquidity and market power in deposit and lending markets. 
Cyclicality can appear in these models but only exogenously through changes in various 
explanatory model variables. Therefore these models predict that, once fully controlling 
for bank-specific and macroeconomic factors affecting loan supply and loan demand, then 
one should observe stable relationships between bank capital and the different 
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dimensions of the bank portfolio decision such as the volume of bank loans and bank loan 
interest rates.  
Our estimation results and tests clearly reject this prediction, suggesting instead that 
the association between bank capital ratios and lending rates alters substantially from the 
pre-crisis (or ‘good times’) period to the crisis (or ‘bad times’) period. For total bank 
lending, the coefficient on the Tier 1 capital ratio is significantly positive pre-crisis 
(October 1998-June 2007) and significantly negative in the period comprising the crisis 
(July 2007-December 2012). The corresponding coefficient in regressions for secured 
household lending (residential mortgages) is significantly positive prior to the crisis and 
significantly negative in the crisis period. For unsecured household lending we find 
instead a positive association in both the pre-crisis and crisis sub-periods, but a significant 
change in magnitude from relatively strong to weak. Finally, for corporate loans we find a 
significant negative association pre-crisis and no association in the crisis period.  
These findings are robust to various specification tests that include: (i) formulating the 
panel model in ‘error correction’ form to capture the short-run dynamics of loan rates, (ii) 
estimating the panel model using rates on new business lending only, (iii) using data 
sampled at the quarterly rather than monthly frequency, (iv) explicitly controlling for 
bank- and time-varying regulatory capital requirements, and (v) allowing not only for bank 
fixed effects but also time fixed effects so as to ensure that all (observed and unobserved) 
aggregate common factors influencing bank loan rate decisions are controlled for.  
As we have stated, many well-established theories of bank decision-making are not 
consistent with this finding of pronounced cyclical instability in the relationship between 
bank capital and lending rates.  One example are those models in which bank capital is 
provides banks with the incentive to apply effort to loan screening and monitoring. This 
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theory predicts that banks with higher capital will make greater monitoring effort, lending 
more and offering lower rates of interest, but provides no obvious explanation for cyclical 
changes in the relationship between bank capital and loan interest rates. The same is true 
of the extensive theoretical literature that focuses on bank risk-return decisions. This 
literature provides a variety of predictions about relationships between bank capital and 
many dimensions of bank decision-making including lending rates, but, again, it provides 
no easy explanation for cyclical variation in those relationships.  
Our finding of cyclical instability in the relationship between bank capital and lending 
rates is though consistent with theoretical perspectives on bank decision-making that 
have emerged since the crisis, exploring endogenous variation in bank leverage and risk 
appetite. This recent literature offers various rationales for changes in bank’s willingness 
to accept risk exposure, between periods of rapid credit expansion – when, for example, 
the bank and its investors are optimistic about returns or perceive risks are relatively low 
– and periods of slow credit expansion or contraction – when they may hold opposite 
views, becoming pessimistic about returns or perceiving risks as being relatively high. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the relevant theoretical 
and empirical literature. Section 3 describes our data and methodology. Section 4 
presents the estimation results and a battery of robustness tests. Section 5 concludes. 
2. PRIOR LITERATURE 
2.1 Theoretical perspectives 
This section reviews theories about the relationship between bank capital and other bank 
decisions (including lending rates), starting with those theories that allow for a 
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disciplinary role of capital or for the interaction of capital structure and risk-return 
decisions.1 
One branch of theory, epitomised by the work of Holmström and Tirole (1997), 
emphasises the role of capital as a disciplining device ensuring that banks have sufficient 
‘skin in the game’ to put the necessary effort into loan monitoring.2 It predicts that higher 
bank capital is associated with higher lending volume and lower lending rates. Other 
models highlighting the disciplinary role of short-term wholesale funding (e.g., Diamond 
and Rajan, 2000) suggest the contrasting prediction that a substitution of short-term debt 
funding for bank capital will result in higher lending volume and lower lending rates.  
A much larger body of theory incorporates risk and the role of bank capital structure in 
bank risk-return decisions. The seminal contribution of Merton (1977) shows how deposit 
insurance provides bank shareholders with a put-option on bank returns. Lower bank 
capital can increase the magnitude of this put option (as it moves ‘into the money’) and 
increase the bank’s incentives for risk-taking. This analysis of bank ‘moral hazard’ can be 
extended to accommodate bank franchise value or charter value lost in the event of 
failure (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990). Under-capitalised banks may then seek to reduce 
their risk-exposure so as to protect their charter value (if this incentive outweighs the put 
option offered by the bank safety net).  
These models of bank portfolio risk are further developed in the bank capital, 
competition and risk-taking literature; e.g., in Hellman et al. (2000) greater competition in 
                                                 
1 For brevity, we focus on theoretical perspectives that provide relatively fully worked out models of the 
relationship between bank capital and bank lending volumes and/or interest rates. These are just one part 
of the broader literature exploring the reasons for departure from the Modigliani-Miller propositions for 
banks; for comprehensive reviews, see Miller (1995), and Berger et al. (1995). Nor do we attempt any 
review of the theory on the ‘bank lending channel’ initiated by Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992), in which 
better capitalised banks are predicted to respond less to changes in central bank reserves because they can 
substitute alternative market funding for reserved deposits. 
2 This approach incorporates bank capital into the extensive earlier literature on bank monitoring and 
screening, originating with Leland and Pyle (1977) and Diamond (1984).  
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deposit markets can reduce charter value and lead to increased risk-taking. In Boyd and 
De Nicoló (2005), greater competition lowers the interest rates paid by bank borrowers in 
turn ameliorating agency costs in loan contracts and reducing bank portfolio risk. 
These models of bank risk-return decisions make ambiguous predictions about the 
relation between risk exposure, the quantity of bank lending and loan interest rates. A 
bank could increase its risk exposure either by lowering loan interest rates and hence, 
increasing its lending volume along a standard loan demand; or through a portfolio re-
allocation towards higher-risk assets that offer higher rates of return. In both scenarios, 
the bank’s overall risk exposure is increased but the promised return, that is, the interest 
rate, can be either lower (in the first scenario) or higher (in the second scenario).  
The common denominator of all these theories is that bank lending and portfolio 
decisions are determined by a range of bank-specific and aggregate factors. Once these 
factors are controlled for, one should observe a stable relationship between capital and 
loan interest rates (and other dimensions of bank portfolio decisions such as bank 
lending).  
This is not the prediction of more recent (since the global financial crisis) contributions 
to the literature that emphasise the cyclicality of both bank leverage and bank willingness 
to accept risk (‘risk-appetite’). Prominent contributions are those provided by 
Geanakoplos (2010) (this is per se not an analysis of banking but his models of leverage 
can be applied to banks), Adrian and Shin (2011) and Borio and Zhu (2012).  
Various rationales have been provided for why this cyclical variation might happen; for 
a review, see Gambacorta and Marquez-Ibañez (2011). The ‘leverage cycle’ in 
Geanakoplos (2010) arises from the interaction of heterogeneity in beliefs and constraints 
on borrowing. In expansionary periods optimistic investors are willing to pay high prices 
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for assets which can generate a positive feedback – rising prices increase the access of 
these borrowers to funding which further increases asset prices.  
A second rationale hinges on asset price volatility, notably in Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009) where value-at-risk constraints determine access to leverage. This 
predicts multiple equilibria with the possibility of periods of low volatility, high asset 
prices and (by implication) high levels of lending; or high volatility, low asset prices and 
low lending levels.  
A third rationale is behavioural, with reference to potential investor and intermediary 
irrationality. Periods of low interest rates and rapid growth may lead investors and 
bankers to underestimate risks. In Borio and Zhu (2012), during periods of low perceived 
risk and credit expansion (such as the ‘great moderation’ that preceded the global 
financial crisis), banks see less need to hold much capital against risk; more aggressive 
banks may operate with lower capital and more portfolio risk. This cyclicality may be 
reinforced by increased credit demand, a key mechanism in the Minsky (1986) model of 
financial instability, or by rises in the market value of bank capital (Borio et al., 2001). 
Another explanation offered by Gambacorta and Marquez-Ibañez (2011) is that cyclical 
fluctuations in bank lending may be driven by incentive arrangements that focus 
excessively on short-term performance. 
This literature on cyclical leverage and risk-appetite is new and relatively immature. It 
again offers a range of predictions.  Some versions – for example, those emphasising the 
role of asset price volatility and value-at-risk constraints – suggest that the relationship 
between bank capital and loan interest rates while varying cyclically might be still be 
explained by aggregate market- or economy-wide factors. Other versions of these newer 
theories (for example, those emphasising variation across banks in their optimism about 
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future asset returns or perceptions of risk) explicitly introduce time-varying heterogeneity 
in bank behaviour, in which case the cyclical relationship between bank capital and loan 
interest rates cannot be empirically modelled by the inclusion of aggregate factors.  
2.2 Empirical literature  
Given the wide range of theoretical predictions, it is important to let the data speak on 
the relationship between bank capital and lending decisions (and other bank portfolio 
decisions). Empirical studies yield a range of findings.3  Various papers assess the impact 
of bank capital in the US ‘credit crunch’ of the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Sharpe, 
1995, for a review). Some findings suggest that declines in bank capital reduce loan 
supply (e.g., Bernanke and Lown, 1991; Hancock and Wilcox, 1993; Peek and Rosengren, 
1995). Several recent studies have examined the relationship between bank capital and 
other dimensions of bank decision-making during and following the global financial crisis. 
Banks with relatively illiquid asset portfolios were forced to deleverage (Cornett et al., 
2011). Better capitalised banks increased balance sheet assets relative to other banks 
(Berger and Bouwman, 2013). Closest to our own findings are those of Košak et al. (2015) 
who analysing a sample of annual bank data examine the impact of bank capital on loan 
growth both pre-crisis and during the crisis. Their findings indicate that higher levels of 
capital and retail deposits are both associated with higher loan growth rates, and that the 
impact of Tier 1 bank capital on loan growth is very much higher during the crisis period.  
                                                 
3 Due to space constraints, we do not review in detail the empirical literature on the ‘bank lending channel’ 
and the role of bank capital in response to changes of monetary policy rates; e.g., Kashyap and Stein (2000), 
Angeloni et al. (2003), Ashcraft (2006) and Jiménez et al. (2012). But we can note some parallels to our own 
findings, despite the notable differences in modelling approach. Gambacorta and Marquez-Ibañez (2010) 
report cyclical variation in the bank lending channel while Jiménez et al. (2014) and Ioannidou et al. (2015) 
report increased risk-taking in response to cuts in monetary policy rates (but do not assess cyclical 
variation).  
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Some empirical studies, like ours, assess the relationship between bank capital and 
loan interest rates. Most take a ‘static’ approach in which this relationship is assumed to 
be constant over time (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 
1999; Carbó-Valverde and Rodríguez-Fernández, 2007; Hubbard et al., 2002; Santos and 
Winton, 2010). But others report cyclical variation in the relationship between lending 
rates (or interest margins) and capital even before the global financial crisis. Analysing UK 
syndicated loan data, Steffen and Wahrenburg (2008) find that undercapitalised banks 
during the 1996-2005 period charge higher interest rates during four episodes identified 
as recessionary.  Fischer et al. (2013) study US syndicated loans and find that loan margins 
and the lender’s capital ratio are negatively linked from 1988 to 1992 when both 
regulatory changes and market pressure force bank capital ratios upwards, and positively 
linked during 1993-2007 when banks operated in more benign conditions.  
3. DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Institutional features of UK bank lending markets 
We briefly describe some institutional features of the UK bank lending market. First, 
unlike in the US, there is relatively little fixed interest rate lending. Most mortgage 
lending is variable rate, either linked to wholesale lending rates such as the Bank of 
England base rate (the monetary policy rate), LIBOR or even more commonly at variable 
rates set at the discretion of lenders. Fixed rate residential mortgage lending is relatively 
uncommon and typically rates are fixed for only three to five years.  
Second, also in comparison to other countries, the amount of UK corporate lending is 
relatively small. UK corporate lending (excluding commercial property mortgages) is only 
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around 15% of total sterling bank lending and total UK corporate lending including 
commercial property represents only around 30% of sterling total bank lending. 
Third, the level of competition varies considerably from one lending market to 
another. For residential mortgages and credit cards (the most important form of 
unsecured household lending) there are many competing providers. For corporate 
lending, especially SME borrowers, there are relatively few lenders. 
UK banks, like those in other countries, were affected by the 2007-2009 global 
financial crisis (GFC). This arose in part because of UK bank holdings of US dollar sub-
prime and other structured credit securities. But the main culprit was the extensive 
reliance of UK banks on wholesale funding and on securitisation (the closure of these 
markets was, for example, the reason for the failure of Northern Rock in September 
2007).  
The behaviour of end-of-month CDS prices for each UK bank based on 1- and 5-year 
senior and subordinated debt contracts are indicative of the impact of the crisis. Figure 1 
plots the resulting composite CDS price as a percentage of its average pre-crisis 2004-06 
value for each bank. CDS prices rise sharply from July 2007, coinciding with public 
concerns about the valuation of structured products and a drying up of the market for 
structured securities and for short-term asset-backed commercial paper (Brunnermeier, 
2009).   
[Figure 1 around here]  
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3.2 Key Variables: Lending Rates and Capital Ratios 
We use confidential data submitted by banks to the Bank of England (BoE) and Financial 
Services Authority (FSA).4 During the sample period, banks authorised in the UK 
submitted detailed data to the FSA on a quarterly basis on their balance sheets and 
capital adequacy.  Large commercial banks also submitted data that enables the 
calculation of effective interest rates (defined below) to the BoE on a monthly basis, 
largely for the purpose of monitoring the pass-through of monetary policy decisions into 
market interest rates.     
Differences between the BoE and FSA forms limit the scope of our sample.  Whereas 
the FSA database covers every bank authorised in the UK, the effective rates collected by 
the BoE pertain to a small number of large retail banks which are the most active in the 
UK lending market. Unlike the BoE database, the FSA database does not include branches 
of foreign banks or building societies (since primary responsibility for their prudential 
supervision lies with the home regulator).  Our final sample is necessarily limited to 13 
large and UK-authorised banks that report in both datasets. These 13 banks account for 
around 75% of the UK lending market over the 1998-2012 sample period under study.   
The sample banks are observed over two contrasting periods; one of exuberant credit 
conditions and benign macroeconomic performance up to 2007, and another of financial 
market stress and economic recession thereafter until the end of the sample in 2012. The 
main two variables, lending interest rates and capital ratios, are described next. 
Effective lending rate.  Banks submit to the FSA and BoE the average loan balances 
and interest accrued each month, from which the annualised effective lending rate  
                                                 
4 The prudential functions of the FSA moved into the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) in 2013. 
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       𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ ∙ 𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚. 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚. 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ (1)   
is calculated monthly from 1998 to 2012 for all loans, corporate loans, household secured 
loans and household unsecured loans.  From 2004 to 2012, we can also calculate the 
interest accrued on new loans agreed during the month which allows for a better 
measure of the immediate response to changing funding conditions (new business lending 
rates).  
We opted for the effective rate after considering two alternative sources of lending 
rates employed in extant studies.  One is quoted interest rates representing the interest 
rates advertised for new business, which were used by Fuertes and Heffernan (2009) and 
Fuertes et al. (2010).  These data have two main disadvantages: they do not include rates 
for large corporations which are generally not advertised; and they are quoted rather 
than agreed rates, which means they do not reflect the lending rates actually offered to 
borrowers (e.g., riskier borrowers may have to pay higher interest rates).  Others use 
agreed rates on syndicated loans, e.g. Hubbard et al. (2002) and Santos and Winton 
(2010) in the US market, and Steffen and Wahrenburg (2008) in the UK market.  While 
these represent interest rates agreed by syndicates of banks, they only include loans to 
large corporations and hence, do not include lending to households or to smaller 
businesses.   
Capital ratio.  The measure of bank capital ratio chosen for our empirical analysis is 
𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 1 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎                                  (2) 
instead of the ratio of Tier 1 capital to the regulatory measure of risk-weighted assets. 
The main reason for this choice is that the risk-weighted assets calculation has undergone 
major changes during the sample period, specifically in 2007 when Basel II allows banks to 
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use their own internal models to determine credit risk weights, and in 2011 when the so-
called “Basel 2.5” increased risk weights in the trading book and tightened eligibility 
criteria for regulatory capital.  In addition, risk-weighted ratios have been much criticised 
post-crisis since banks were able to increase leverage substantially while maintaining 
healthy regulatory risk-weighted capital ratios (Turner, 2009).  We also prefer Tier 1 
capital (common equity, reserves and certain hybrid equity-like securities) to the Tier 1 
plus Tier 2 capital. This is because Tier 2 capital (subordinated debt and some hybrid 
instruments) was revealed by the crisis not to be truly loss-absorbing on a going concern 
basis.  
3.3 Panel Regression Model and Control Variables 
Our main reduced-form model, aimed at estimating the long-run association between 
bank lending rates (lit) and bank capital ratios (kit), can be formalised as follows  
     𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑊𝑊𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 + 𝐺𝐺𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .                           (3) 
This is a panel regression with bank fixed effects (Ai) and various controls to mitigate 
endogeneity arising from factors that simultaneously influence the lending interest rate 
and capital ratios;  𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁 are banks and t=1,…,Ti are months (the panel is 
unbalanced with a maximum Ti of 148 months per bank, and an average Ti of 97 months). 
The fixed effects are aimed at capturing unobserved bank-specific heterogeneity such as 
the business model. The estimation method is pooled ordinary least squares (OLS).  
The overall motivation for the control variables is to mitigate endogeneity (omitted 
variable) bias in the coefficient of interest K. The controls (𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )ʹ are 
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bank-specific variables.5  The first four are measures of bank portfolio risk that, according 
to the theories outlined in Section 2 above, can be expected to be correlated both with 
lending rates and capital ratios. These are the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets (𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), ratio of provisions to total loans and other debt instruments (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), ratio of write-offs 
to total loans (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), and ratio of corporate loans to total loans (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖).6  
For the same reason, we also include each bank’s total assets (𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, expressed in £ 
billions) and measures of each bank’s competitive position, the share of loans (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) and 
the share of total deposits (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖).
7 These are standard controls in empirical banking.8 
The remaining control variables (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖)ʹ are macroeconomic indicators aimed at 
controlling for business-cycle endogeneity arising from common shocks that influence 
both the lending rate and the capital ratio. The most obvious candidate is the BoE base 
rate that is the target interest rate for UK monetary policy (bt, expressed as a monthly 
average).  In practice, interest rates for interbank lending can diverge from the BoE base 
rate due to expectations of losses which increase in periods of stress, together with term 
structure risk or the premium associated with lending at longer maturities.  This 
motivates as control variable the spread of 1-year LIBOR over the BoE base rate (𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖, also 
as a monthly average). Our third macroeconomic control is the output gap (gt) defined as 
                                                 
5 In an additional exercise we include the average CDS price on 5-year debt of banks in our models as a 
market measure of bank risk. The variable is significantly positively linked with lending rates.  However, CDS 
prices reflect banks’ capital ratios as well as the portfolio risk of the banks, so we do not report these 
results. 
6 The provisions data (Bank of England form PL) used to construct 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  include debt investments as well as 
loans, as provisions data exclusively for loans are not available over our entire sample period.  To derive 
appropriate scalars for these variables we have constructed series for the stock of loans and investments 
which broadly match the provisions data (using the Bank of England forms BT and BE).   
7 The denominator is the total lending and deposits for all UK banks, not just those in our sample, from the 
Bank of England http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/bankstats/.   
8 Bank size is known to be correlated with capital ratios, and for this reason is used in most empirical studies 
of bank capital, e.g. Francis and Osborne (2012) and Jokipii and Milne (2008) and especially important in the 
context of lending rates where large banks may have lower funding costs (see Berger and Turk-Ariss, 2015).   
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the deviation of actual real GDP from “potential” or trend real GDP to control for loan 
demand.9  
We begin by estimating the long-run panel model (3) using total lending rates (lit) as 
the dependent variable. Then we re-estimate the model for household secured loans 
(𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐), household unsecured loans (𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
ℎ𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐) and lending rates on corporate loans (𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐). 
Accordingly, we redefine the ratio of write-offs to loans in each of these sectoral models 
as 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐 and 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐 respectively, to reflect the specific risks in each loan 
category. We also redefine the loan market share variables as 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐and 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐 
to reflect the bank’s competitive position in each of these loan sub-markets.  The 
sampling frequency is monthly for all variables except capital ratios (𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), output gap (𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖) 
and write-offs (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) which are only available quarterly. We convert them to monthly by 
linear interpolation. 
We estimate the model using the entire sample together with a crisis dummy 
interacted with all the variables (including the bank fixed effects) to accommodate 
changes from the ‘good times’ period to the ‘bad times’ period in all the model 
parameters. Such a model produces identical results to estimating separate models for 
the two sub-periods, but has the advantage that it enables standard tests for the 
significance of parameter changes.  The crisis dummy takes value 0 from the beginning of 
the sample on October 1998 until June 2007 (the ‘good times’ period), and 1 from July 
2007 until the sample end on December 2012 (the ‘bad times’ period).  The choice of July 
2007 as the cut-off point is grounded empirically on the evolution of the banks’ CDS 
prices since these are likely to reflect investor sentiment about each bank (Figure 1).  The 
reason for including all months up to December 2012 in the ‘bad times’ period is that, 
                                                 
9 The source of the output gap data is the OECD Economic Outlook.  
15 
 
although the acute liquidity crisis was essentially resolved by early 2009, the banking 
sector continued to be distressed due to low capital levels and the risk of losses stemming 
from the European sovereign debt crisis.  As shown in Figure 1, the CDS indices remain at 
a higher level through 2009-2012. 
3.4 Robustness Tests 
In order to assess the robustness of the results, we carry out various robustness checks. 
We begin by embedding the long-run model (3) in lagged form, rewritten as 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗 =
𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗∗ + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗, into a dynamic error correction model (ECM) which can be formalised as 
 ∆𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + �𝛽𝛽ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1
∆𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−ℎ + �𝜷𝜷𝒉𝒉ʹ𝐻𝐻
ℎ=0
∆𝒁𝒁𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝒉𝒉 + δ�𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗 − 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗∗ � + 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.    (4a)  
Model (4a) is more general in that it nests model (3) and additionally captures the short-
run dynamics of lending rates; the vector Z𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≡ (𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 ,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖)ʹ  
gathers all the control variables.  An ECM is previously used, for instance, by Fuertes and 
Heffernan (2009) and Fuertes et al. (2010) to analyse the long-run relationship between 
UK retail bank interest rates and the BoE base rate while simultaneously capturing their 
short-run behaviour. In this formulation, the lending rate changes (∆𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) in response to 
deviations of the current lending rate 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗 from its long-run path 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗
∗  which is often 
referred as the cointegration path; the economic intuition behind the concept of 
cointegration is that 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗   acts as an attractor for the interest rate 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 over the long run so 
that the deviation �𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗 − 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗
∗ � can be conceptualised as a zero-mean stationary 
process. Hence, the term δ�𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗 − 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗∗ � has the interpretation of an error correction or 
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catch-up mechanism that pulls the loan rate towards its long run path 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗  in the wake of 
exogenous shocks.10  
Accordingly, the above ECM can be conveniently re-parameterised as follows 
 
∆𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 + �𝛽𝛽ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1
∆𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−ℎ + �𝜷𝜷𝒉𝒉ʹ𝐻𝐻
ℎ=0
∆𝒁𝒁𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝒉𝒉 + 𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗 + 𝜹𝜹𝒁𝒁𝒕𝒕−𝒋𝒋 + 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖      (4b) 
where 𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿 and 𝜹𝜹 ≡ (𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾,𝛿𝛿𝑅𝑅 , 𝛿𝛿𝑃𝑃, 𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊,𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶 , 𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆, 𝛿𝛿𝑀𝑀, 𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷 ,𝛿𝛿𝐵𝐵, 𝛿𝛿𝐹𝐹 , 𝛿𝛿𝐺𝐺)ʹ are long-run parameters.  
Therefore, the long-run effect of the capital ratio on the lending rate can now be obtained 
as 𝐾𝐾 = −𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾 𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿⁄ . Similarly, the long-run effects of the controls gathered in 𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are given 
by the corresponding coefficient in the vector 𝜹𝜹 multiplied by −1/𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿.  The crucial short-
run effect, according to the goal of this paper, is the coefficient that measures the 
association between the capital ratio and lending rate which is given by 𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽ℎ𝐾𝐾𝐻𝐻ℎ=0 . 
Model (4b) also includes bank-specific fixed effects and is estimated by OLS.  
The appropriate lag parameter j in the long-run component of the model, that is, the 
“error correction” mechanism that drives the lending rate towards its long-run path, is 
identified using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  This lag length reflects rigidities in 
the lending rate (e.g., difficulties in renegotiating contractual terms) that may prevent 
changes in the key variables driving the long run path, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗  , from immediately materializing 
as changes in the lending rate, ∆𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.  For this identification purpose, we begin by 
estimating a baseline ECM with no additional lags of the first-differenced variables (H=0) 
but considering different values for the lag parameter j (from 1 to 6 months) in 𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗  and 
in the different variables 𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗 that drive the long-run path. We select the lag that 
minimises the AIC.  This lag length identification process is conducted for each (overall 
                                                 
10 We deployed the panel Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test on each of the variables in (2) in the pre-crisis 
and crisis periods and in the majority of cases (including our key variables of interest, the lending interest 
rate and the capital ratio) the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot easily be rejected. 
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and sectoral loans) model, since loans in each sector may have different maturity profiles 
or contractual features which influence the mechanism of “catch-up” towards the long-
run path. Once the appropriate lag length j is identified, we augment the equation with as 
many short-term lags ℎ = 1,2, … ,𝐻𝐻 as required to absorb the residual autocorrelation.  
The lagged dependent variable (∆𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−ℎ) can induce a bias in dynamic panel regression 
although any lagged-dependent-variable bias is likely to be small in our ECM estimation 
given the large T dimension (about 150 months) relative to the cross-section dimension 
(N=13 banks) of our sample.  The most common method of dealing with this bias is to 
adopt the General Method of Moments (GMM) estimation; however, this is precluded in 
our context because of the small N.  Alternative, one can estimate the ECM using the 
Corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable estimator of Bun and Kiviet (2003) and Bruno 
(2005) which is appropriate for small N; hence, we take this route. The bias-corrected 
coefficients are very close to those obtained by standard pooled OLS and so we only 
report the latter below.  
We then present a range of further robustness checks. The first of these robustness 
checks is re-estimation of the long-run panel model, Eq. (3), with quarterly data to 
address concerns that observing the capital ratios, write-offs and output gap quarterly 
and then interpolating them to monthly observations might have contaminated our 
earlier findings.  
The second robustness check is the inclusion of the capital requirement set by the FSA 
(denoted krit) as additional control variable in Eq. (3) to mitigate another potential source 
of endogeneity bias for the coefficient of interest K in model (3). Capital requirements can 
influence a bank’s capital ratios and at the same time correlate with a bank’s lending 
strategy and hence, influence the pricing and/or risk of loans; e.g., a bank pursuing a risky 
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expansionary business strategy may be subject to higher capital requirements by the 
regulator.11  Capital requirements also changed substantially over the sample period.12  
The additional control variable krit included in Eq. (3) for these purposes is the 
regulatory capital requirement set by the FSA until April 2008 as the ratio of Tier 1 capital 
to risk-weighted assets multiplied by the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets. 
From April 2008 onwards, we replace this capital requirement variable with a flat 8% ratio 
of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets multiplied by the bank’s ratio of risk-weighted 
assets to total assets wherever this exceeds the bank- and time-specific FSA capital 
requirement.  
A third robustness check as regards estimation of Eq. (3) includes monthly time fixed-
effects instead of the macroeconomic control variables (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 ,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖)ʹ. The purpose is to 
ensure that our earlier results are not biased due to omission of other aggregate effects. 
A final robustness check is an estimation of the long-run model (3) for total and 
sectoral lending using monthly data on new business loans defined as new loans or 
renegotiated outstanding loans during the month.  This re-estimation is rather limited on 
two accounts. The first limitation is that data are available only for the period 2004-2012. 
The second limitation is that the portfolio-risk control variables (𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) and the 
loan market share variable (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) refer to existing business lending not to new business 
lending. 
                                                 
11 Francis and Osborne (2012) and Aiyar et al. (2014) provide evidence of these links for the UK market. See 
also the literature cited in Section 2.2 on the US ‘credit crunch’ in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
12 The pre-crisis capital requirements were set at the level of the regulatory risk-weighted total capital ratio 
and varied across banks and over time according to FSA judgements (see Francis and Osborne, 2012). From 
2008, Tier 1 capital ratios rose substantially as the FSA set higher benchmark expectations for firms in the 
context of the government support package for major banks, including a minimum Tier 1 capital ratio of 8%. 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Preliminary Data Analysis 
The dynamics of monthly bank lending rates (lit), write-offs to total loans (wit) and Tier 1 
capital ratio (kit) during the entire sample period –October 1998 to December 2012 – is 
illustrated in Figure 2. The graphs show means across all the i=1,…,N banks (N=13). 
[Figure 2 around here] 
Panel A shows the average monthly lending rate for all loans, household secured loans, 
household unsecured loans and corporate loans alongside the BoE base rate. During the 
pre-crisis period, all rates tracked the BoE base rate fairly closely with a spread of 
between 50-150 basis points (bp) for household secured loans and corporate loans and 
400-700 bp for household unsecured loans, reflecting a notably larger credit risk premium 
for the latter.  In 2008 there is a profound shift as the BoE base rate fell to an historic low 
of 50 bp and the spread between lending rates and BoE base rate widened considerably 
to 300 bp for household secured and corporate loans and to 800 bp for household 
unsecured loans.  The wider spread is likely to reflect both heightened loan credit risk 
premia and increases in banks' cost of funding due to investors' concerns about bank 
creditworthiness, as demonstrated by the CDS dynamics shown in Figure 1 and the spread 
between the BoE base rate and the 1-year LIBOR rate shown in Figure 2 (Panel A).  
Panel B of Figure 2 shows the average write-offs over total loans for household 
secured lending, household unsecured lending and corporate lending.  Again there is a 
clear contrast between the pre-crisis period and the crisis period.  Household unsecured 
loans have a write-offs ratio of 1-2% in the pre-crisis period which doubles to around 5-
8% in the crisis period, after which it broadly returns to pre-crisis levels.  Corporate loan 
write-offs are between 0.3% and 0.7% in the pre-crisis period but rise to between 2% and 
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4% in the crisis period.  Household secured write-offs are 0.01-0.03% pre-crisis and 
increase to around 0.08-0.13% during crisis period, before declining to 0.04-0.05% 
thereafter.   
Panel C of Figure 2 shows the average of bank Tier 1 capital ratios and their risk-
weighted version.  Both fell between 2004 and 2007 and then rose notably thereafter.  
Finally, the new business loan rates are shown in Panel D of Figure 2.  As one would 
expect, new business rates are more volatile than existing rates.  Nonetheless, despite 
significant spreads opening up in particular months of both positive and negative sign, 
there is no visual evidence that these spreads persist for any length of time.  
The sample distribution of each variable (data pooled across banks and months) is 
summarised in Table 1 over the entire 1998-2012 period, the ‘good times’ or pre-crisis 
period (up to June 2007) and the ‘bad times’ or crisis period (from July 2007 onwards).  
[Table 1 around here] 
The capital ratio, write-offs to total loans ratio and LIBOR spread are much lower pre-
crisis than in crisis. The BoE base rate, lending rates and output gap are also much lower 
in crisis.  The risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio is lower in the crisis period. Lending 
rates are highest for unsecured lending, and fall little in the crisis period.  The household 
secured and corporate loan rates are generally lower, and fall more notably in the crisis 
period.   
4.2 Estimation results 
Table 2 reports the estimation results for the baseline model, Eq. (3), adding interaction 
variables (i.e., the crisis dummy variable interacted with all other variables) so as to allow 
for full parameter heterogeneity from ‘good times’ to ‘bad times’. We focus our 
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discussion primarily on the main parameter of interest, the coefficient K on the Tier 1 
capital ratio, and we report Wald tests for the change in this parameter only, for space 
constraints.13 
[Table 2 around here] 
In the all-loans regression, the model parameter K is significantly positive during the 
pre-crisis period and becomes significantly negative during the crisis period.  Turning to 
the different sub-categories of lending, there is a similarly large change, economically and 
statistically, in the coefficient K for both household secured (residential mortgage) and 
household unsecured lending.  While for both household secured and unsecured loans 
the capital ratios versus lending rates association is significantly positive in the ‘good 
times’ it becomes much smaller (unsecured loans) or changes sign (secured loans) in the 
‘bad times’.  
The results for corporate lending also reveal a significant change in K from the ‘good 
times’ to the ‘bad times’. This change is, however, in the opposite direction to that 
detected for the two categories of household lending. Pre-crisis, the capital ratios versus 
loan rates association is significantly negative whereas during the crisis period the 
corresponding coefficient becomes essentially zero suggesting no association.  As 
revealed by the Wald test statistics in Table 2, all of these changes in the coefficient K are 
highly significant.  
We briefly comment on the estimates of the coefficients pertaining to the control 
variables in Table 2. The share of corporate loans (cit) is consistently positive and larger 
during the crisis (with the exception of corporate lending where the coefficient falls 
during the crisis).  Bank size and loan and deposit market share are negative and highly 
                                                 
13 Similar unreported Wald tests for the significance of changes in each of the other model parameters 
revealed that the change from pre-crisis to crisis is not just confined to the Tier 1 capital ratio coefficient.  
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significant in the total loan model.  For individual loan sectors, these variables are also 
highly significant, though there is a mixture of positive and negative coefficients.   
The coefficient of the BoE base rate (bt) is positive and significant throughout, 
unsurprisingly. The coefficient of the output gap (gt) is consistently negative, but lower in 
the crisis period than pre-crisis, and while always significant pre-crisis it becomes 
insignificant during the crisis period for both categories of household lending.  
We interpret the significant changes reported in Table 2 for the coefficient K on the 
capital ratio in our loan rate regressions as evidence of a cyclical change in risk appetite of 
the kind discussed in the newer literature on cyclical bank leverage and risk appetite. 
Note that this interpretation can explain our finding of a significant change in sign of the 
coefficient K that is of the opposite direction for corporate lending and for household 
lending. This is a consequence of the theoretical ambiguity about the relationship 
between risk appetite and lending rates discussed above in Section 2. Risk may be 
reduced in the crisis either by raising loan rates along a loan demand function for one 
category of lending (this might be the case for the household secured lending) while at 
the same time changing the composition of lending from relatively high risk loans offering 
higher rates of interest to relatively low risk loans offering lower interest rates for 
another category of lending (this might be the case for the corporate lending).   
Turning to the robustness tests, the estimation results for the ECM specification (4b) 
that captures long- and short-term mechanisms are shown in Table 3. To preserve space, 
we report the long-run parameters for all variables as in Table 2, but regarding the short-
run effects we focus on the parameter of interest (𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾) concerning the capital ratio. 
[Table 3 around here] 
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The results on the long-run association between bank capital ratios and lending rates 
obtained from the ECM are broadly consistent with those from the long-run model (3). In 
particular, the Wald test statistics still reveal a significant change from pre-crisis to crisis 
for household secured and corporate loans.  For household secured rates and corporate 
rates, the change observed in the short-run coefficient 𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾 from pre-crisis to crisis is 
aligned with the direction of the change in the long-run coefficient K, which emphasises 
the evidence. 
All the remaining robustness tests concerning the long-run model (3) are gathered in 
Table 4. We report only the coefficient of interest K and the corresponding Wald test 
statistic for the significance of change from the pre-crisis to crisis periods. The unreported 
coefficients on the control variables (the same controls as those used in our baseline 
analysis summarised in Table 2) do not change much from one robustness check to 
another; the full set of estimation results are available from the authors upon request.  
[Table 4 around here] 
Panel I of Table 4 reproduces our baseline estimates of K from Table 2 for comparison. 
Panel II reports the same coefficient estimates using quarterly data. Panel III reports the 
coefficient estimates when including capital requirements as an additional control. In 
both of these panels the reported coefficient estimates and the Wald test statistic for the 
null hypothesis of no-change in K are almost unchanged from the baseline results in Panel 
I. 
Panel IV reports the coefficient estimates K and corresponding Wald tests when 
replacing the three macroeconomic controls with time fixed-effects. The coefficient 
estimates for all loans and household secured lending are little changed. For household 
unsecured lending K now switches from significantly positive pre-crisis to significantly 
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negative in crisis. For corporate lending K now switches from significantly negative pre-
crisis to significantly positive in crisis. The Wald test statistic now rejects the no-change 
null hypothesis in the coefficient K  for all three sub-categories of lending as well as all-
loans.  
Finally Panel V reports the re-estimation of K in the long-run model, Eq. (3), once 
again with the crisis dummy interacted with all variables but now using new business 
lending rates as the dependent variable.  Here, not surprisingly since we are losing two 
thirds of our pre-crisis sample (the estimation period is 2004-2012, as noted in Section 
3.4) there is a substantial change in the pre-crisis coefficient estimates for K. 
Reassuringly, the coefficient estimates for the crisis period are relatively little changed.  
The coefficient K on the capital ratio is now negative in all cases, both pre-crisis and 
during the crisis-period. This final robustness test suggests the possibility of further 
instability in the capital ratio versus lending rate relationship of interest within the pre-
crisis period. These estimation results should be interpreted with caution however since, 
as noted earlier, the available portfolio-risk control variables and loan market share all 
refer to existing business lending.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper reports estimates of the relationship between bank capital and bank lending 
rates over the period 1998-2012 using data on the 13 largest UK banks that account for 
around 75% of UK lending. For household secured loans we find a positive long-run 
relationship between capitalisation and loan interest rates in the pre-2007 period (‘good 
times’) and a negative relationship during the subsequent period (‘bad times’). For 
unsecured household lending we find instead a positive association in both sub-periods 
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but with a substantial and significant change in magnitude from pre-crisis to crisis (from 
relatively strong to weak, respectively). Finally, for corporate loans we find a negative 
association pre-crisis and no association during the sample period that includes the crisis. 
This finding of pronounced cyclical instability in the relationship between bank capital 
and lending rates is difficult to reconcile with many well-established theories of bank 
decision-making. We have reviewed theories in which bank capital is needed to provide 
banks with the incentive to apply effort to screening and monitoring of loans and also 
models of the impact of bank capitalisation on bank choices about portfolio risk and 
return. These analyses offer a variety of predictions about the relationship between bank 
capital and lending rates, but they all suggest that this relationship should be stable over 
time once fully controlling for aggregate macroeconomic and bank-specific factors.  
Our reported coefficient instability might reflects shifts in the distribution of loan 
demand and therefore be consistent with these well-established theories of banking.  For 
example, the instability may be a consequence of a pre-crisis shift in the distribution of 
the demand for lending across banks according to their particular regional or sectoral 
customer exposure that was subsequently reversed. Despite controlling for aggregate 
determinants of bank loan demand by including macroeconomic variables in our 
regressions (and replacing these with time-specific effects in a robustness check), we 
cannot definitively rule out the possibility of such a compositional shift in demand.   
Still a plausible interpretation of our finding of instability in the parameter measuring 
the association between bank capital ratios and lending rates is that it is a consequence 
of cyclical mechanisms highlighted in the newer theoretical perspectives on bank 
decision-making that have emerged since the crisis. This recent literature suggests a 
variety of reasons for why the bank willingness to accept risk exposure may vary between 
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periods of rapid credit expansion and periods of slow credit expansion or even 
contraction.  
The precise mechanisms involved merit exploration. For example, some banks may 
have been more optimistic than others about future returns during the pre-crisis period 
and, as a result, operated with comparatively low levels of capital and accepted relatively 
high portfolio risk. Then, with the onset of the crisis, these same banks may have found 
themselves over-extended and needed to reduce portfolio risk. Further research is 
required on a wider range of bank decisions, and for other countries and time periods, to 
establish which variants of these newer theories of cyclical changes of bank leverage and 
risk-appetite offer the best explanations of observed bank portfolio and loan decisions. 
Work is also warranted on the impact of minimum regulatory capital requirements and of 
the newly introduced regulatory capital buffers, for example, the ‘capital conservation 
buffer’ in Basel III, both in expansionary and contractionary phases of the credit cycle.14
                                                 
14 Also, in relation to the literature on the ‘bank-lending channel’ discussed in previous footnotes, more 
research is warranted on cyclical variation in the response of bank loan volumes and bank risk-taking to 
changes in monetary policy rates. 
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Figure 1. Bank CDS prices. Bank CDS prices are obtained by averaging the prices of 1 year 
senior, 1 year subordinated, 5 year senior and 5 year subordinated CDS contracts from Credit Market 
Analysis (CMA) and Thomson Reuters. The resulting bank CDS prices are expressed as ratios (in 
percentage) over the corresponding average of the bank CDS price from December 2003 to December 
2006. The figure shows the ratios for 6 of the 13 sampled banks on which data is available over the 
entire sample period. 
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         Panel A: Lending Interest Rate                   Panel B: Write-Off Ratio and Output Gap 
                  
 
      Panel C: Tier 1 Capital Ratio           Panel D: New Business Lending Interest Rate 
                              
Figure 2. Lending rates, write-offs and Tier 1 capital.  Panels A to C plot average (across banks) loan interest rates, write-offs ratios alongside the output 
gap, and Tier 1 capital over the sample period October 1998 to December 2012.  Panel D shows the average (across the 13 banks in the sample) interest rate on 
new loans granted each month from January 2004 to December 2012. These new loan rates are not strictly comparable to those graphed in Panel A as the new 
business rates cover slightly different categories of loans.  See http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Documents/reporters/defs/def_er2014.pdf. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for lending rates, capital ratios and controls. 
 
Notes: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of all variables pooled across banks and 
months in pre-crisis (October 1998-June 2007) and crisis (July 2007-December 2012) periods. lit is the 
lending rate as defined in (1) measured for all loans and, separately, for household (un)secured loans 
and corporate loans. kit is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total (unweighted) assets. krit is the capital 
requirement set by the FSA regulator as explained in Section 2.4 of the main text. rit is the ratio of risk-
weighted to total assets. pit is the ratio of provisions to total loans and debt investments. cit is the ratio 
of corporate loans to total loans. wit is the ratio of write-offs to total loans measured separately for 
household (un)secured and corporate loans. sit is the total assets of each bank expressed in £ billions. mit is each bank’s share of loans which is measured separately for household (un)secured and 
corporate loans. dit is each bank’s share of total deposits. bt is the target overnight interest rate set by 
the BoE. ft is the spread of the 1 year LIBOR rate over the bank rate. gt is the OECD estimate of the UK 
output gap.  
 
  
Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev
I. Bank-specific variables
Lending rate 6.02 1.51 6.51 1.24 4.73 1.40
Household secured lending rate 5.46 1.38 5.91 0.83 4.63 1.76
Household unsecured lending rate 10.14 1.89 10.15 2.15 10.09 1.07
Corporate lending rate 5.69 1.87 6.43 1.17 3.72 1.94
Tier 1 capital ratio 3.61 1.55 3.29 1.29 4.46 1.84
Capital requirement 2.03 0.80 1.99 0.80 2.14 0.81
Risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio 40.80 17.30 44.63 17.63 30.68 11.32
Provisions to loans and investments ratio 0.77 0.58 0.83 0.58 0.59 0.53
Corporate loans to total loans ratio 20.44 15.56 20.09 1.67 21.35 13.30
Write-offs to loans ratio 1.95 1.86 1.61 16.33 2.87 2.02
Household secured write-offs to loans ratio 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.08
Household unsecured  write-offs to loans ratio 3.10 2.92 2.29 2.18 5.00 3.49
Corporate write-offs to loans ratio 0.74 1.31 0.48 0.69 1.41 2.09
Total assets, £bn 258 258 156 151 526 289
Share of total loans 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.05
Share of household unsecured loans 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.04
Share of household secured loans 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.06
Share of corporate loans 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.04
Share of deposits 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.03
II. Macroeconomic variables
BoE base rate 3.99 1.86 4.81 0.80 1.84 2.11
1y LIBOR spread to BoE base rate 0.50 0.48 0.33 0.40 0.97 0.35
Output gap 0.10 2.26 1.02 0.78 -2.31 2.98
Pre-crisis period Crisis periodFull sample
(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐)(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐)(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐)(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
( )h secitl
( )h secitw
( )hun secitl
( )hun secitw
( )corpitl
( )corpitw
( )tf
( )tg
( )tb
( )itl
( )itk
( )itkr
( )itr
( )itp
( )itc
( )itw
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Table 2. Estimation results for long-run model of lending rates. 
 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the long-run equation (3) for lending rates with fixed bank 
effects. The data are monthly from October 1998 to June 2007 (pre-crisis period) and from July 2007 
to December 2012 (crisis period) for N banks. See note to Table 1 for variable definitions. The numbers 
in parentheses are Newey-West h.a.c. standard errors. The numbers in square brackets are p-values. 
  
Variable (coefficient) Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis
Tier 1 capital ratio (K ) 0.048*** -0.084*** 0.077*** -0.065*** 0.181*** 0.051** -0.223*** -0.016
(0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.042) (0.021) (0.029) (0.016)
    Wald test statistic (prob), Ho: K pre-crisis  = K crisis
Risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio (R ) -0.004** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.031*** -0.022*** 0.007** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Provisions to loans and investments ratio (P ) 0.017 -0.021 -0.149*** 0.043 0.021 -0.581*** 0.093 0.064
(0.035) (0.069) (0.040) (0.068) (0.099) (0.100) (0.065) (0.076)
Corporate loans to total loans ratio (C ) 0.003 0.044*** 0.006** 0.016*** 0.003 0.013*** 0.029*** 0.008**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Write-offs to loans ratio (W ) 0.049*** 0.007 0.012* 0.053*** -0.005 -0.058*** -0.041** 0.004
(0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Total assets (S ) -0.000*** -0.001** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.002*** -0.001** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share of total deposits (D ) -1.521* -4.850*** -4.090*** 3.497*** 9.704*** -1.044 11.820*** 0.164
(0.780) (0.742) (0.507) (0.694) (1.615) (0.833) (1.258) (0.637)
Share of total loans (M ) -2.514*** -3.030***
(0.804) (1.096)
Household secured
       write-offs to loans ratio (W hsec ) -0.616*** 0.569***
(0.173) (0.199)
       share of loans (M hsec ) -2.469*** 1.350*
(0.681) (0.794)
Household unsecured
       write-offs to loans ratio (W hunsec ) 0.053** 0.007
(0.024) (0.008)
       share of loans (M hunsec ) 5.418* -4.524***
(2.841) (1.709)
Corporate
       write-offs to loans ratio (W corp ) 0.234*** -0.016
(0.035) (0.016)
       share of loans (M corp ) -18.703*** 4.159***
(1.347) (1.604)
BoE base rate (B ) 0.864*** 0.637*** 0.849*** 0.584*** 0.859*** 0.242*** 0.816*** 0.961***
(0.011) (0.025) (0.010) (0.024) (0.030) (0.035) (0.021) (0.027)
1y LIBOR spread to BoE base rate (F ) 0.032 -0.030 0.051*** -0.009 0.188*** -0.094 0.013 0.019
(0.023) (0.053) (0.020) (0.051) (0.060) (0.075) (0.042) (0.059)
Output gap (G ) -0.246*** -0.050*** -0.266*** -0.026 -0.574*** -0.010 -0.107*** -0.077***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.045) (0.026) (0.031) (0.020)
No. of observations (T×N )
No. of banks (N )
Adjusted-R 2
37.28 [0.000] 57.53 [0.000] 6.52 [0.011] 27.45 [0.000]
Household secured Household unsecured CorporateAll loans
1715
13
0.962
1309
10
0.971
1556
12
0.877
1707
12
0.929
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Table 3. Estimation results for error correction model of lending rates. 
 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the Error Correction Model for lending rates with fixed bank-
specific effects, equation (4b), with enough short-term lags (H) to absorb all residual autocorrelation. 
The data are monthly from October 1998 to June 2007 (pre-crisis period) and from July 2007 to 
December 2012 (crisis period) for N banks. The long-run effect of the capital ratio (kit) on the lending 
rate (lit) is measured by the composite parameter 𝐾𝐾 = −𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾/𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿 as shown in the table; likewise, for all 
the other variables. The short-run effect of the capital ratio on the lending rate is measured by the 
composite parameter 𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽ℎ𝐾𝐾𝐻𝐻ℎ=0 . See note to Table 1 for variable definitions. The numbers in 
parentheses are Newey-West h.a.c. standard errors. The numbers in square brackets are p-values. 
Variable (coefficient) Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis
A. Long-run effects
Tier 1 capital ratio (K ) 0.068* -0.004 0.120 -0.180 0.283** 0.099 -0.265*** 0.132
(0.040) (0.041) (0.103) (0.121) (0.135) (0.068) (0.086) (0.107)
      Wald test statistic (prob), Ho: K pre-crisis  = K crisis
Risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio (R ) -0.009** -0.016** 0.010 0.010 -0.040*** -0.020* 0.014 -0.038*
(0.004) (0.007) (0.016) (0.020) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.020)
Provisions to loans and investments ratio (P ) 0.097 0.211 -0.506 0.217 0.044 -0.276 0.058 0.438
(0.088) (0.188) (0.332) (0.466) (0.312) (0.312) (0.190) (0.465)
Corporate loans to total loans ratio (C ) -0.001 0.047*** -0.013 0.012 0.003 0.017 0.032*** -0.001
(0.005) (0.008) (0.020) (0.017) (0.022) (0.011) (0.009) (0.020)
Write-offs to loans ratio (W ) 0.070*** 0.137*** -0.014 -0.033 0.018 0.019 -0.032 -0.073
(0.023) (0.049) (0.052) (0.120) (0.080) (0.083) (0.050) (0.118)
Total assets (S ) -0.001* -0.001** 0.001 -0.000 -0.002* 0.002** -0.000 -0.002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Share of total deposits (D ) -0.242 -4.692** -3.462 6.445 18.015*** -0.772 11.911*** 0.097
(1.983) (1.970) (3.948) (4.593) (5.164) (2.600) (3.726) (3.833)
Share of total loans (M ) -2.509 -5.895**
(2.061) (2.968)
Household secured
       write-offs to loans ratio (W hsec ) -1.500 -9.325
(1.368) (25.892)
       share of loans (M hsec ) -11.460* -2.401
(6.056) (5.109)
Household unsecured
       write-offs to loans ratio (W hunsec ) 0.046 -0.058
(0.078) (0.104)
       share of loans (M hunsec ) 3.922 -7.124
(9.060) (5.270)
Corporate
       write-offs to loans ratio (W corp ) 0.333*** 2.381
(0.104) (4.330)
       share of loans (M corp ) -16.428*** 14.652
(3.957) (10.009)
BoE base rate (B ) 0.855*** 0.623*** 0.691*** -0.252 0.904*** 0.229* 0.839*** 0.929***
(0.030) (0.080) (0.096) (0.350) (0.098) (0.130) (0.065) (0.197)
1y LIBOR spread to BoE base rate (F ) 0.424*** -0.127 0.859*** 1.284** 0.542** 0.115 0.214 0.125
(0.076) (0.157) (0.264) (0.584) (0.243) (0.261) (0.155) (0.394)
Output gap (G ) -0.190*** -0.015 -0.331** 0.504** -0.423*** 0.021 -0.024 0.037
(0.042) (0.058) (0.131) (0.231) (0.148) (0.096) (0.093) (0.147)
B. Short-run effect
Tier 1 capital ratio (β K) 0.014 0.010 0.066* -0.009 0.081 0.073 -0.078 0.049
(0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.029) (0.076) (0.069) (0.061) (0.057)
No. of observations (T×N )
No. of banks (N )
Adjusted-R 2 0.222
121213
0.374
10
0.315 0.111
All loans Household secured CorporateHousehold unsecured
1702 1269
1.59 [0.207] 3.53 [0.060] 1.48 [0.224] 8.32 [0.004]
1544 1695
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Table 4. Robustness tests for long-run model of lending rates.  
 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the coefficient of Tier 1 capital ratio in model (3) for lending 
rates. Panel I reproduces the estimates obtained in Table 2 for comparison. Panel II pertains to the 
estimation based on quarterly data. Panel III pertains to model (3) with capital requirements as 
additional control. Panel IV reports results for model (3) with time fixed effects instead of the 
macroeconomic variables.  Panel V reports results for new business lending rates. In all cases, the data 
are monthly from October 1998 to June 2007 (pre-crisis) and from July 2007 to December 2012 (crisis) 
except for Panel V where the pre-crisis period is shorter from January 2004 to June 2007 due to data 
constraints on new business lending rates. See note to Table 1 for variable definitions. The numbers in 
parentheses are Newey-West h.a.c. standard errors. The numbers in square brackets are p-values.  
 
Variable (coefficient) Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis
I.  Baseline estimates (from Table 2)
        Tier 1 capital ratio (K ) 0.048*** -0.084*** 0.077*** -0.065*** 0.181*** 0.051** -0.223*** -0.016
(0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.042) (0.021) (0.029) (0.016)
        Wald test statistic (prob), Ho: K pre-crisis  = K crisis
II.  Quarterly observations
        Tier 1 capital ratio (K ) 0.048* -0.065** 0.070*** -0.075*** 0.170** 0.068* -0.196*** -0.012
(0.026) (0.025) (0.020) (0.023) (0.070) (0.036) (0.053) (0.028)
        Wald test statistic (prob), Ho: K pre-crisis  = K crisis
III.  Controlling for capital requirements
        Tier 1 capital ratio (K ) 0.054*** -0.083*** 0.077*** -0.065*** 0.174*** 0.051** -0.195*** -0.016
(0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.040) (0.021) (0.028) (0.016)
        Wald test statistic (prob), Ho: K pre-crisis  = K crisis
IV.  Time fixed-effects
        Tier 1 capital ratio (K ) 0.037** -0.100*** 0.083*** -0.099*** 0.199*** -0.176*** -0.278*** 0.315***
(0.016) (0.025) (0.014) (0.020) (0.039) (0.059) (0.028) (0.043)
        Wald test statistic (prob), Ho: K pre-crisis  = K crisis
V.  New business lending rates
        Tier 1 capital ratio (K ) -0.012 -0.050** -0.134*** -0.065*** -0.532*** -0.043 -0.025 -0.006
(0.063) (0.022) (0.042) (0.024) (0.103) (0.070) (0.037) (0.028)
        Wald test statistic (prob), Ho: K pre-crisis  = K crisis
All loans Household secured Household unsecured Corporate
0.38 [0.539] 1.24 [0.265] 9.69 [0.002] 0.11 [0.740]
37.28 [0.000] 57.53 [0.000] 6.52 [0.011] 27.45 [0.000]
16.03 [0.000] 23.73 [0.000] 8.86 [0.003] 53.69 [0.000]
10.73 [0.001] 23.65 [0.000] 1.24 [0.265] 6.24 [0.013]
41.04 [0.000] 56.53 [0.000] 6.53 [0.012] 24.69 [0.000]
